Author: Kaushik Dutta
Bangladesh has recently upgraded its legal approach to sexual violence. However, a fundamental gap still exists. An adult man is not explicitly regarded as a rape victim under section 375 of the Penal Code 1860. In cases where a man is subjected to forced sexual penetration, the law does not refer to the act as rape. The only alternative is section 377, which makes it illegal to engage in “carnal intercourse against the order of nature”. This is not just a matter of wording; it affects how the violence is perceived and addressed in court.
The issue is rather out of place in light of Bangladesh’s more recent reforms. The Women and Children Repression Prevention (Amendment) Act 2026 was passed on 10 April 2026 following the reforms implemented in 2025. These reforms had the effect of enhancing the protection available to children, including by acknowledging sexual abuse of boys. However, section 375 still defines rape in terms of a male perpetrator and a female victim. This leads to an odd legal inconsistency, which is that a boy can obtain statutory recognition for the same form of sexual violence which an adult man cannot.
Section 377 is an unsuitable alternative since it focuses on whether the act is “against the order of nature” rather than whether the victim gave free and informed consent. In reality, this can cause a survivor of sexual violence to be treated as if they had taken part in an “unnatural offence”. The rape law ought to recognise an infringement of bodily autonomy, not judge sexual acts in moral terms. A criminal justice system that is unable to identify the wrong consistently is likely to downplay the survivor’s experience.
Bangladesh’s Constitution supports the argument. According to Article 27, all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection under it. Article 28(1) bans discrimination on the basis of sex, among other grounds. Article 31 ensures protection under the law, including protection of the body and liberty, and Article 32 secures life and personal liberty. The provisions do not need to provide identical treatment in all cases; for instance, Article 28(4) allows for special provisions to apply to women and children. However, offering stronger protection to certain groups is not the same as failing to provide another group with a consistent legal remedy for the same basic violation.
The matter has already been brought before the High Court Division; in 2021, a writ petition was filed questioning the gender-based definition of rape, and in April 2022 the Court issued a Rule requesting an explanation as to why section 375 should not be made gender-neutral. The gap is thus an unresolved question concerning equality and access to justice.
The colonial background of section 377 also merits consideration. The wording of the provision comes from the Indian Penal Code of 1860, and its approach regarding ‘unnatural offences’ is based on an outdated view of sexuality that stems from criminal morality. In the case of Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1, India’s Supreme Court interpreted section 377 in such a way that it no longer criminalised consensual sexual acts between adults, with the reasoning being that such acts are in line with dignity, privacy, equality and personal liberty. However, Navtej does not set a precedent for defining male rape, since the case was about consensual sexual conduct between adults and not about recognising men as victims of rape. Although the significance of the case is more limited, it is still important because it demonstrates how the ‘unnatural offences’ framework can be removed by the Constitution when it treats sexual behaviour in terms of morality rather than autonomy. The Court also stated that section 377 still applies to non-consensual sexual acts and to acts involving minors.
There is a practical solution in the field of comparative law. The UK’s Sexual Offences Act 2003 distinguishes between rape and assault by penetration and bases liability on intentional sexual acts carried out without consent. Similarly, Canada’s Criminal Code uses a gender-neutral definition of sexual assault and regards consent as the voluntary agreement of the complainant to the sexual activity. These examples demonstrate that sexual offences can be organised based on conduct and consent.
Bangladesh ought to amend section 375 to include a gender-neutral, consent-based definition of rape. The provision must include any intentional sexual penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth carried out without free and voluntary consent, particularly in cases where consent is missing due to force, threats, coercion or incapacity. The law should also state that the special rules for the protection of children continue to apply. Introducing gender neutrality will broaden the protection offered rather than weaken the extra safeguards currently in place for women and children.
The reform doesn’t need to abolish section 377 at once. Instead, its main role should be to cease being the sole means of bringing sexual violence against adult men to prosecution. Rape must be prosecuted as rape. Sexual violence should be seen as an attack on bodily autonomy and not as an “unnatural” act. The recent reforms in Bangladesh demonstrate that the law is capable of evolving. The next step should be to make the legal recognition of rape depend on the lack of consent and on the fact of harm, not on the victim being a woman.
About the Author:
Kaushik Dutta is a South Asian Foundation (SAF) Scholar and LL.M. candidate at the UNESCO Madanjeet Singh Institute of Advanced Legal and Human Rights Studies (UMSAILS), University of Asia Pacific. He earned his LL.B. (Hons) from East West University on a 100% Merit Scholarship. His research focuses on human rights, gender justice, and justice reform. He served as an Undergraduate Teaching Assistant, Street Lawyer with i-Probono, and mentors ANUKUL (Bangladesh). His legal writing has been published in The Daily Star.